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Abstract
Wide spread use of biometric based authentication implies the need to secure biometric reference data. Various template protection
schemes have been introduced to prevent biometric forgery and identity thefts. Cancelable biometrics is a recent approach
introduced to address the concerns regarding privacy of biometric data, public conﬁdence, and acceptance of biometric systems.
It allows biometric templates to be cancelled and revoked like passwords innumerable times. The work proposes a novel cancelable
biometric template generation algorithm using Gaussian random vectors and one way modulus hashing. Instead of using the
original templates, the proposed system uses its transformed versions for storing and matching. The approach is tested on face and
palmprint biometric modalities. A thorough analysis is performed to analyze the performance, non-invertibility, and distinctiveness
of the proposed approach which reveals that the generated templates are non-invertible, easy to revoke, and also deliver good
performance.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of organizing committee of the Eleventh International Multi-Conference on Information
Processing-2015 (IMCIP-2015).
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1. Introduction
Biometric data is a success for granting access control in various commercial applications such as ATMs, credit
cards, bank accounts; government applications such as ID cards, passports, visa, electronic voting, and a number of
forensic applications. While the use of biometric templates is easy, convenient and reliable, there are some securities
and privacy related issues that need to be addressed:
1. Impersonation/Identity theft: Attackers are able to covertly acquire biometrics for example, latent ﬁngerprints and
build its physical/digital artifacts to gain illegitimate access.
2. Sensitivity: Biometric data reveals a lot of personal and sensitive information about the person.
3. Security: Biometric data is being increasingly shared leading to tracing and tracking of users across different
databases by matching their reference templates.
4. Loss of biometric is permanent: The number of biometric is limited and their compromise/theft can render it
useless for the entire lifetime of a user.
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Biometric templates are deployed to increase robustness and security of a system. However at the same time various
security and privacy issues are stemming from the use of biometrics. Such situations are leading to a growing gap
between the increasing yet conﬂicting demands of “biometrics for security” and “biometric data protection”. To bridge
this gap, biometric template protection schemes are required to protect the biometric data/feature, while at the same
time maintain capability to identify and verify individuals.
In order to secure the biometric data, it should never be stored in a clear format or the format in which they
are obtained from a user. Biometric template protection techniques suggest use of some auxiliary/helper data to
transform the reference biometric into a new format such that the above mentioned concerns can be addressed. It is
required that, these transformed templates must not compromise the ability to identify/verify individuals, maintain
discriminability and intra-user variability, and address various attack scenarios. Cancelable biometrics is an important
template protection approach that allows generation of secure and renewable biometric templates which can be
cancelled and revoked like passwords innumerable times. This work aims to produce cancelable biometric templates
that are non-invertible and deliver a better performance. Cancelability is achieved by projection of biometric template
on random matrix whose columns are normally distributed (Gaussian) vectors having zero mean and unit variance
followed by a one-way modulus hashing.
Paper is organized as follows. A formal deﬁnition of cancelable biometrics, related work and motivation towards
the proposed work is provided in Section 2 which is followed by the proposed template transformation approach in
Section 3. The experimental results are covered in Section 4 and the work is ﬁnally concluded in Section 5.
2. Related Work
To address the above mentioned security and privacy issues Soutar et al. (1998) took initiatives to generate
renewable and revocable biometric templates1, and some concrete concepts in this direction were given by Ratha et al.
(2001)2. Cancelable biometrics is deﬁned as “an intentional and systematically repeated distortions on the biometric
data in order to protect the user speciﬁc sensitive information”. The biometric template is distorted by subjecting it to
transformation functions based on some user deﬁned transformation key or parameter. This transformed template is
stored at the time of enrollment as the reference template. At authentication, the query template is distorted using the
same transformation function and the user speciﬁc parameters, thereafter matched with the reference template. Both
storing and matching of templates is performed in transformed domain. It provides high level privacy by allowing
multiple templates to be associated with the same biometric data. At every enrollment a different transformation
function and/or parameters can be used to generate the protected template. This helps to promote non-linkability of
users biometric data stored across various databases. Biometric salting and non-invertible transformations are two
main approaches for template transformation.
BioHashing proposed by Teoh et al. (2004) is an instance of biometric salting in which a Tokenized (pseudo)
Random Number (TRN) is combined with biometric features to generate BioCodes3. In this approach, biometric
features are projected on an orthonormal random matrix generated by TRN followed by a two level quantization
using thresholding function which results in binary codes called BioCodes. Sutcu et al. (2005) proposed robust
hashing technique which uses non-invertible transforms, involving nonlinear operations to improve the security
of template4. However, there exists a tradeoff between discriminability and achieving non-invertibility using this
technique. Teoh et al. (2006) proposed BioPhasoring to address the invertibility issue5. The technique generates a set
of complex vectors where the original vectors form the real part and rows of the orthonormal random vector form
the imaginary part. This way, BioPhasoring keeps on mixing user speciﬁed TRN with the biometric data iteratively
and straight forward revocation is possible by token replacement. Secure hashing of dynamic hand signatures
using Biophasor mixing and 2n discretization for cancelable keys generation is given in6. Teoh and Yaung (2007)
proposed Multispace Random Projection (MRP), a variant of BioHashing to address the stolen token scenario7.
MRP extracts a ﬁxed length feature vector from the raw biometric template and projects it on a non-invertible
random sub-space multiple times. Lumini et al. (2007) suggested an improvement in BioHashing by utilizing MRP,
different threshold values and fusion of scores8. Savvides et al. (2004) proposed another instance of biometric salting
for generating cancelable face templates using Minimum Average Correlation Energy (MACE) ﬁlter and random
kernels9.
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Non-invertible transformation functions are usually one way surjective functions that are easy to compute but hard
to inverse. These transforms are used to modify the biometric data into a new form within the context of signal or
feature domain. A realization of non-invertible transform was proposed by Ratha et al. (2007) which suggested that
a ﬁngerprint data can be transformed by three different non-invertible transformation functions, Cartesian, polar, and
surface folding transformation on the minutiae positions10. Tulyakov et al. (2005) proposed symmetric hash functions
(polynomials) for distorting minutiae information11. The hash functions were irreversible because of their one way
characteristics, and in case of compromise new templates can be issued by changing the hash functions. Ang et al.
(2005) proposed key dependent algorithms based on geometric transformations to generate cancelable ﬁngerprint
templates12. Bout et al. (2007) proposed Biotokens, a cryptographically secure technique, which divides the datum
into two parts. One part is used for encoding purpose, and the other for approximating a match and support robust
distance computation13. Farooq et al. (2007) presented a concept of generating cancelable bit strings from ﬁngerprint
by extracting translational and rotational invariants minutiae triplets14. On the same line, Lee et al. (2009) proposed
minutiae based bit strings to generate cancelable ﬁngerprint templates15.
Both the above mentioned approaches have their own advantages and disadvantages. BioHashing has been
experimentally proven to achieve nearly zero Equal Error Rates (ERR) for various modalities, there by leading to a
substantial increase in performance when the system operates in the transformed domain. But, if an adversary gains
an access to the transformed template and random data (token stolen), that can generate a coarse approximation of
the original template as the process is invertible. Hence, the security of the data is compromised and performance
regresses in a stolen token scenario. The security of the non-invertible transformations lies in the fact that even
if the token and/or the transformed template are stolen, it is computationally hard for an adversary to obtain the
original biometric data. However, many a times non-invertible transforms tends to compromise discriminability of
the transformed templates there by decrease in performance. To maintain a balance between discriminability and
non-invertiblity is a major challenge while designing template transformation techniques. The work is motivated
towards designing a transformation approach such that the templates are easy to revoke, difﬁcult to invert and does
not degrade performance.
3. Template Transformation
This work produces cancelable biometric templates by projection of biometric template on random matrix whose
columns are normally distributed (Gaussian) vectors having zero mean and unit variance followed by a one-way
modulus hashing. The properties of Gaussian projection and step wise approach are discussed in the following sections.
3.1 Gaussian random projection
Random projection is a powerful dimensionality reduction tool. Its key concept arises from Johnson and
Lindenstrauss lemma (JL lemma) which states that a set of d points in a high dimensional Euclidean space can be
mapped down onto a k-dimensional subspace (k ≥ O(logd/2)), such that the distances between the points are
approximately preserved (i.e., not distorted more than a factor of (1 ± , for 0 <  < 1)16. Using matrix notation,
the original data can be represented as Xd×N , which can be considered a set of N observations of dimension-d . Its
projection on a k- dimensional random subspace (k  d) is denoted as
X RPk×N = Rk×d Xd×N , (1)
where R is random k × d matrix whose columns has unit norm and XRP is the projection of X in lower dimensional
subspace. The effect to which pair-wise distances between points before and after projection are preserved depends
upon the projection vectors ri ∈ R. The essential property of the projection matrix in J L lemma is that its column
vectors ri ∈ R are required to be orthogonal to each other. Gram Schmidt orthogonalization process is a technique
that is usually applied to transforms the columns of a random vector into orthogonal ones. Achieving orthogonality is
a very computationally expensive process.
To improve the computation costs of dimensionality reduction algorithms various variants and improvements are
proposed by researchers20. In a research on approximating nearest-neighbor in a high dimensional Euclidean space,
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Indyk and Motwani noted that the condition of orthogonality can be dropped while using random projections. To prove
it, they computed a random projection matrix whose column entries are independent random variables with the
standard normal distribution N(0, 1). By using the properties of normal distribution, they proved that the projection
x RP of a unit vector x ∈ d has the chi-square distribution with k-degrees of freedom, and tail estimates for this
distribution can be used to prove that the pair-wise distance between any two points is not distorted by a factor more
than (1 ± )17. Dasgupta proposed a similar construction of random projection matrix in which each row is also
rescaled to a unit vector. Using elementary probabilistic techniques they proved that the preservation of pair-wise
distance before and after projection18. Projection on normally distributed (or Gaussian distributed) random vectors,
having zero mean and unit variance is a distance preserving mapping with less computation costs. According to the
properties of normally distribution, the linear projection of a Gaussian remains Gaussian. Hence, a mixture of high
dimensional Gaussians onto a single vector will be producing a mixture of univariate normally distributed variables.
For a deeper insights and mathematical proofs the following papers are suggested to be referred17,19, 21.
3.2 Proposed transformation algorithm
The following operations are performed to generate a cancelable template:
Step 1. A raw biometric grayscale image is acquired and its columns are stored as a set of N , d-dimensional vectors,
I ∈ d . In matrix form it can be represented as Id×N .
Step 2. The image is preprocessed by extraction of region of interest from the sample followed by illumination
enhancement. The effect of uniform illumination with linear scale of lighting intensity can be adjusted by
simple gray-level histogram equalization. Histogram equalization uniformly distributes the intensity values
of the image and produces an enhanced image of better contrast and increased dynamic range.
Step 3. Generate a set of k-dimensional normally distributed random vectors having zero mean, unit variance
and values ranging between [−1, 1] such that {ri ∈ k |i = 1, . . . , d}. The vectors ri are column wise
concatenated to produce the random projection matrix Rk×d .
Step 4. Project the acquired biometric data image matrix I on the Gaussian random matrix R. Its projection on a
k-dimensional random subspace (k  d) is denoted as given in Eq. (1). In terms of matrices it can be
expressed as ⎡
⎣
I RP1,1 · · · I RP1,N
· · · · ·





R1,1 · · · R1,d
· · · · ·





I1,1 · · · I1,N
· · · · ·
Id,1 · · · Id,N
⎤
⎦ (2)
Step 5. Apply low pass Gaussian ﬁlter to smoothen the image. A Gaussian ﬁlter smoothes an image by calculating
weighted average in a ﬁlter box and attenuates high varying intensity components.
Step 6. The column wise mean of the projected matrix I RP is calculated and stored in a vector M , M ∈ k . The
elements of vector M are transformed are transformed as:
M( j) = min{256, abs(M( j)) + 1} (3)
where abs is absolute value function and  represents greatest integer function.
Step 7. Using vector M , compute modulus separately for each j th column of the projected template as:
I T (:, j) = I RP (:, j) mod M( j), (4)
where j varies from 1 to N and the total number of rows and columns being k and N respectively. After
computing the transformed template I T , the vector M is discarded.
Step 8. Approximate the fractional values of the elements of I T towards positive inﬁnity. Since the maximum value
of modulus is 256, the resultant transformed template after approximation has integral values ranging from 0
to 255.
Block diagram of the proposed algorithm is given in Fig. 1. The matching is performed in the transformed domain
by calculating Euclidean distances between the extracted vectors of the transformed reference and query biometric
template. In case of compromise of the templates, new ones can be generated by changing the token/projection matrix.
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of the proposed approach.
4. Experimental Results and Discussion
An experimental study is performed to study various aspects of the proposed system such as matching performance
and distinctiveness of the transformed templates. As non-invertibility is an essential characteristic of cancelable
template, the stolen token scenario is also analyzed to determine the strength against invertibility attacks.
4.1 Databases used for experimentation
The performance is evaluated on two different biometric modalities, i.e., face and palmprint. For face modality
three different standard facial databases, ORL, Indian face database, and Extended Yale Face Database B are used.
ORL22 is an expression variant database consisting of 40 subjects with 10 images per subject capturing different
facial expressions . Extended YALE face database23 is an illumination variant database containing 64 near frontal
images for 38 subjects under various illumination conditions. Out of it only 10 images per subject are selected with
uniform illumination having linear scale of lighting intensity variations. The Indian face database24 is a collection of
61 subjects, 39 males and 22 females with 11 images per subjects collected by IIT Kanpur for different orientation of
face, eyes, and emotions on face. For each database, 3 images are randomly selected for training database and 6 images
for test database. To study the functional performance of the proposed system on palmprint image templates CASIA25
and PolyU26 databases are also used. CASIA contains 5,239 hand images captured from 301 subjects corresponding
to 602 palms. PolyU database includes 600 images from 100 individuals, with 6 palmprint images from each subject.
For these palmprint databases, 2 images for training and 4 images for testing purposes are randomly selected after
extraction of region of interest27.
4.2 Performance evaluation on facial and palmprint image templates
The performance is evaluated on Equal Error Rates (ERR) and Decidability Index (DI ). Decidability Index (DI )
is deﬁned as the normalized distance between means of Genuine (μG ) and Imposter distributions (μI ). DI index
measures the conﬁdence in classifying patterns for a given classiﬁer. Higher values of DI indicate better decidability
while classifying genuine and imposter populations. DI is calculated as
DI = |μG − μI |√
(σ 2G + σ 2I )/2
(5)
To establish a bench mark for comparison, the performance of the system is calculated when the templates are
stored and matched in the original format (without any transformation) using two most common techniques Principal
Component Analysis (PCA)28 and Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA)29,30. All the original image templates are
resized to d×N pixels, where d = N = 128. The projection matrix is a set of d column vectors which are generated as
normally distributed pseudorandom numbers in the range of [−1, 1] having zero mean and unit variance. The column
vector ri belongs to k-dimensional Euclidean space, ri ∈ k and let initially k = d = 128. The matrices are square
and on transformation the dimensions of the template is same as that of the original, i.e., 128 × 128 pixels.
Table 1 and 2 provides ERR and DI for matching performance in original domain and transformed domain for face
and palmprint respectively. For both the modalities in comparison to the original domain, ERR values in transformed
domain are very low and near to zero. Similarly, DI increases in transformed domain indicating better separability
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Table 1. Matching performance for face databases.
Original templates Transformed templates
PCA LDA PCA LDA
Database ERR DI ERR DI ERR DI ERR DI
ORL 12.44% 1.897 4.2% 2.542 0.00% 5.254 0.00% 6.511
YALE 32.5% 0.855 11.7% 1.698 0.03% 4.568 0.08% 5.936
Indian face 10.6% 1.639 8.5% 1.546 0.12% 4.591 0.00% 5.293
Table 2. Matching performance for palmprint databases.
Original templates Transformed templates
PCA LDA PCA LDA
Database ERR DI ERR DI ERR DI ERR DI
PolyU 9.2% 1.22 2.3% 1.54 0.21% 4.582 0.08% 5.939
CASIA 4.3% 1.85 0.8% 2.0 0.19% 4.685 0.02% 5.845
Fig. 2. Population distribution for original templates of ORL face database, (a) PCA based matching; (b) LDA based matching.
Fig. 3. Population distribution for transformed templates of ORL face database, (a) PCA based matching; (b) LDA based matching.
between templates in transformed domain. Figures 2 and 3 represent genuine and imposter population distribution
curves for ORL database before and after transformation respectively. Figures 4 and 5 depict genuine and imposter
population distribution curves for PolyU database before and after transformation respectively. It is seen in Figs. 3
and 5 that the separation between genuine and imposter population increases signiﬁcantly after applying the proposed
transformation.
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Fig. 4. Population distribution for original templates of PolyU palmprint database, (a) PCA based matching; (b) LDA based matching.
Fig. 5. Population distribution for transformed templates of PolyU palmprint database, (a) PCA based matching; (b) LDA based matching.
The increase in performance is due to the fact that random projection increases inter-user variations. For each user
the projection matrix is different, and hence it is possible to obtain a clear separation between the genuine population
and the imposter population.
4.3 Invertibility analysis
Consider the stolen token scenario, when the transformed template I T and the key projection matrix R are available
simultaneously. The key projection matrix R is a square matrix, hence its inverse exists.The inverse operation
(decryption) requires projection of the transformed template over the inverse of key matrix computed as
I inv−proj = R−1 ∗ I T (6)
The next step requires an attacker to have the exact knowledge of the values over which modulus is computed for
each column, i.e., the mean vector M . Since the vector is discarded after transforming the template it is not available
with the attacker. Yet, we consider a scenario where the exact vector M is also available with the attacker. The inverse
template is obtained by computing modulus for the j th column of I inv−proj using the j th value of vector M as
I rec = I inv−proj(:, j) mod M( j), (7)
where j varies from 1 to N , the total number of rows and columns are d and N respectively. Combined Eq. (2) and
(4), and Eq. (6) and (7) are analogous to the Hill cipher encryption and decryption equations, respectively. Hill cipher
is a symmetric encryption algorithm and works on blocks of data. To encrypt a block of plaintext P of size n × 1, a
key matrix K of size n × n is required which has non-negative integral values ranging from 0 to N − 1 where N = 26
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Fig. 6. Samples of a few original templates.
Fig. 7. Samples of transformed templates relative to templates shown in Fig. 6.
Fig. 8. Samples of inverted templates obtained from the transformed templates shown in Fig. 7.
for alphabets and N = 256 for gray level images. The ciphertext C is obtained by matrix multiplication of K over P
followed by computing the modulus over N , represented as
C = (K ∗ P) mod N (8)
The determinant of the encryption matrix K must be relatively prime to N , where C1 = (K1,1 ∗ P1 + · · · + K1,n ∗ Pn)
mod N and Cn = (Kn,1 ∗ P1 + · · · + Kn,n ∗ Pn) mod N . To decrypt the ciphertext, inverse of the key matrix K−1 is
required to be computed. The equation for decryption process can be written as:
P = (K−1 ∗ C) mod N (9)
To perform decryption it is necessary that the key matrix must be invertible, which essentially requires it to be a
square matrix and gcd(det(K ) mod N, N) = 1. Here gcd is the greatest common divisor and det(K ) denotes the
determinant of K . Though the key matrix might be invertible, the recovered/decrypted information might still suffer
from the loss of information. To ensure a perfectly lossless recovery of data after decryption, it is necessary that all
elements of the inverse key matrix, K−1 should contain non-negative integral values.
In our case the key matrix comprises of normally distributed column vectors whose elements have rational values
ranging between [−1, 1]. Thus its inverse would always possess rational entries making the decryption operation
suffer from serious loss of information content. When a grayscale image matrix having non-negative values between
[0, 255] is projected on normally distributed random matrix [−1, 1], the resulting matrix is a set of negative and
non-negative fractional values which are later subjected to modulus operation. When the transformed matrix is
subjected to decryption operation the information is not recoverable. Figs. 6, 7 and 8 illustrate the samples of actual
image templates, their transformed versions, and their recovered templates, respectively. The recovered templates are
lousy and most of the original information is not recovered.
4.4 Histogram analysis
Histograms are plotted to analyze the intensity distribution of matrix elements at various stages. The histogram
of the original image matrix, the projected matrix, the transformed matrix, and the recovered matrix for a sample
biometric face image template is depicted in Fig. 9. On comparing the histograms of the recovered and the original
images it is found that they are completely different from each other. This indicates that the recovered template does
not reveal any information about the original image.
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Fig. 9. Histograms of, (a) Original image, I ; (b) Projected image, I RP ; (c) Transformed image I T ; (d) Recovered image I rec .
4.5 Distinctiveness analysis
The ability to generate various transformed template by changing the transformation parameter is the basis of
achieving revocability and diversity.The correlation coefﬁcients is calculated among various transformed templates of
biometric samples having different transformation matrix (random projection matrix R) using Eq. (10)
Cr (I1, I2) =
∑∑
(I1 − I¯1)(I2 − I¯2)√
(I1 − I¯1)2 + (I2 − I¯2)2
, (10)
where I¯1, I¯2 represents the mean of images I1, I2 respectively. At ﬁrst, correlation coefﬁcients are calculated between
transformed templates belonging to same subject and transformed templates belonging to different subjects keeping
ﬁxed and unique projection matrix for each subject. It is found that correlation coefﬁcients ranges from 0.5 to 0.75 for
different transformed templates belonging to same subject indicating similarity. The correlation coefﬁcients between
templates belonging to different subjects is nearly zero, indicating that there does not exists any correlation between
transformed templates of different subjects.
In the next case, the biometric image samples are kept ﬁxed and different transformed templates are created by
changing the random matrix. The correlation coefﬁcients between various transformed versions of the same biometric
sample is calculated and found to be nearly zero, indicating no correlation.
4.6 Comparison with BioHashing
Essentially both the techniques deliver comparable performance i.e., nearly zero EER. Apart from the nature of
the random projection matrices, i.e., orthonormal in BioHashing and Gaussian (normally distributed) in the proposed
approach, there are some other essential differences. While BioHashing only generates binary valued codes, the
proposed template possesses integral values between [0, 255]. BioHashing claims non-invertibility by performing
binarization, is a many to one mapping on the basis of a ﬁxed threshold value. However, recent attacks have proved
that in stolen token scenario, when the transformed template and the projection matrix is simultaneously available,
it is possible to invert the process and generate an approximate pre-image of the original biometric31,32. Hence, it is
practically an invertible process. On the other hand the proposed approach is non-invertible and maintains performance
in stolen token scenarios as proved in the above sub-sections.
5. Conclusion
The transformed templates produced in the proposed approach deliver better performance as compared to their
original counterparts. Thus, the proposed approach successfully meets an important requirement of achieving good
recognition rates in the transformed domain. Non-invertiblity being an important requirement is also thoroughly
analyzed and the transformed templates are not found to reveal any original information when subjected to inverse
operations. Revocability and diversity is achieved by simply changing the random projection matrix. However, the
complexity is increased due to the involvement of matrix multiplication operations.
670   Harkeerat Kaur and Pritee Khanna /  Procedia Computer Science  54 ( 2015 )  661 – 670 
References
[1] C. Soutar, D. Roberge, A. Stoianov, R. Gilroy and B. V. Kumar, Biometric Encryption using Image Processing, In Photonics West’98
Electronic Imaging, International Society for Optics and Photonics, pp. 178–188, (1998).
[2] N. K. Ratha, J. H. Connell and R. M. Bolle, Enhancing Security and Privacyin Biometrics – Based Authentication Systems, IBM Systems
Journal, vol. 40(3), pp. 614–634, (2001).
[3] A. T. B. Jin, D. N. C. Ling and A. Goh, Biohashing: Two Factor Authentication Featuring Fingerprint Data and Tokenised Random Number,
Pattern Recognition, vol. 37(11), pp. 2245–2255, (2004).
[4] Y. Sutcu, H. T. Sencar and N. Memon, A Secure Biometric Authentication Scheme Based on Robust Hashing, In Proceedings of the 7th
Workshop on Multimedia and Security ACM, pp. 111–116, (2005).
[5] A. B. J. Teoh and D. C. L. Ngo, Biophasor: Token Supplemented Cancellable Biometrics, In IEEE 9th International Conference on Control,
Automation, Robotics and Vision, ICARCV’06, pp. 1–5, (2006).
[6] Y. W. Kuan, A. B.Teoh and D. C. Ngo, Secure Hashing of Dynamic Hand Signatures using Wavelet – Fourier Compression with Biophasor
Mixing and 2n discretization, EURASIP Journal on Applied Signal Processing, vol. (1), pp. 32–32, (2007).
[7] A. Teoh and C. T. Yuang, Cancelable Biometrics Realization with Multispace Random Projections, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and
Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics, vol. 37(5), pp. 1096–1106, (2007).
[8] A. Lumini and L. Nanni, An Improved Biohashing for Human Authentication, Pattern Recognition, vol. 40(3), pp. 1057–1065, (2007).
[9] M. Savvides, B. V. Kumar and P. K. Khosla, Cancelable Biometric Filters for Face Recognition, In Proceedings of the 17th International
Conference on Pattern Recognition, ICPR 2004, vol. 3, IEEE; pp. 922–925, (2004).
[10] N. Ratha, J. Connell, R. M. Bolle and S. Chikkerur, Cancelable Biometrics: A Case Study in Fingerprints, In 18th International Conference
on Pattern Recognition, ICPR 2006, vol. 4, IEEE, pp. 370–373, (2006).
[11] S. Tulyakov, F. Farooq and V. Govindaraju, Symmetric Hash Functions for Fingerprint Minutiae, In Pattern Recognition and Image Analysis,
Springer, pp. 30–38, (2005).
[12] R. Ang, R. Safavi-Naini and L. McAven, Cancelable Key-Based Fingerprint Templates, In Information Security and Privacy, Springer,
pp. 242–252, (2005).
[13] T. E. Boult, W. J. Scheirer and R. Woodworth, Revocable Fingerprint Biotokens: Accuracyand Security Analysis, In IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, CVPR’07, IEEE; pp. 1–8, (2007).
[14] F. Farooq, R. M. Bolle, T. Y. Jea and N. Ratha, Anonymous and Revocable Fingerprint Recognition, In IEEE Conference on Computer Vision
and Pattern Recognition, CVPR’07, IEEE, pp. 1–7, (2007).
[15] C. Lee and J. Kim, Cancelable Fingerprint Templates using Minutiae-Based Bit-Strings, Journal of Network and Computer Applications,
vol. 33(3), pp. 236–246, (2010).
[16] S. Dasgupta and A. Gupta, An Elementary Proof of the Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma, International Computer Science Institute, Technical
Report, pp. 99–006, (1999).
[17] P. Indyk and R. Motwani, Approximate Nearest Neighbors: Towards Removing the Curse of Dimensionality, In Proceedings of the Thirtieth
Annual ACM Symposium on Theoryof Computing, ACM, pp. 604–613, (1998).
[18] S. Dasgupta, Learning Mixtures of Gaussians, In Foundations of Computer Science, 1999. 40th Annual Symposium on, IEEE, pp. 634–644,
(1999).
[19] E. Bingham and H. Mannila, Random Projection in Dimensionality Reduction: Applications to Image and Text Data, In Proceedings of the
Seventh ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, ACM, pp. 245–250, (2001).
[20] J. Matousˇek, On Variants of the Johnson–Lindenstrauss Lemma, Random Structures & Algorithms, vol. 33(2), pp. 142–156, (2008).
[21] B. Klartag and S. Mendelson, Empirical Processes and Random Projections, Journal of Functional Analysis, vol. 225(1), pp. 229–245, (2005).
[22] ORLface Database, AT&T Laboratories Cambridge; http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/.
[23] Yaleface Database, Center for Computational Vision and Control at Yale University, http://cvc. yale.edu/projects/yalefaces/yalefa/.
[24] The Indianface Database, IIT Kanpur, http://vis-www.cs.umas.edu/.
[25] CASIA Palmprint Database, Biometrics Ideal Test, http://biometrics.idealtest.org/downloadDB/.
[26] PolyU Palmprint Database, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, http://www4.comp.polyu.edu.hk/b˜iometrics/.
[27] H. Kekre, T. Sarode and R. Vig, An Effectual Method for Extraction of roi of Palmprints, In Communication, Information & Computing
Technology (ICCICT), 2012 International Conference on IEEE, pp. 1–5, (2012).
[28] M. A.Turk and A. P. Pentland, Face Recognition using Eigenfaces, InComputer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 1991. Proceedings CVPR’91,
IEEE Computer Society Conference on IEEE, pp. 586–591, (1991).
[29] M. S. Bartlett, J. R. Movellan and T. J. Sejnowski, Face Recognition by Independent Component Analysis, Neural Networks, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 13(6), pp. 1450–1464, (2002).
[30] T. Connie, A. Teoh, M. Goh and D. Ngo, Palmprint Recognition with pca and ica, In Proc. Image and Vision Computing, New Zealand,
(2003).
[31] P. Lacharme, E. Cherrier and C. Rosenberger, Preimage Attack on Biohashing, In International Conference on Security and Cryptography
(SECRYPT), (2013).
[32] Y. Lee, Y. Chung and K. Moon, Inverse Operation and Preimage Attack on Biohashing, In Computational Intelligence in Biometrics: Theory,
Algorithms and Applications, CIB, IEEEWorkshop on IEEE, pp. 92–97, (2009).
